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The Washington State Democratic Party recently filed suit
against the state of Washington alleging that the state's blanket
primary system' was unconstitutional because it was considered
repugnant to the party's first and fourteenth amendment associ-
ational rights. The blanket primary system permits voters to
decide from among all candidates for each office, regardless of
party affiliation.2 Because the Washington blanket primary per-
mits interparty crossover voting during the primary election, the
party argued that it was effectively denied the right to associate
for the purpose of choosing its own party candidates for elective
office. In a unanimous decision," the Washington Supreme Court
dismissed the suit on the grounds that the Democratic Party
had failed to show a substantial burden on its associational
rights,4 and further, that there is a compelling state interest sup-
portive of the blanket primary system.' The question the Demo-
cratic Party raised, however, continues to be of both legal and
political interest. At issue is the scope and nature of constitu-
tional protection to be afforded party autonomy by the first and
fourteenth amendments. The purpose of the present discussion
is to review both legal and political sides of this question. Once
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1. The Washington statute provides: "All properly registered voters may vote for
their choice at any primary election, for any candidate for each office, regardless of polit-
ical affiliation and without a declaration of political faith or adherence on the part of the
voter." WASH. REv. CODE § 29.18.200 (1979).
2. The blanket primary differs from open and closed primaries. The open primary
system allows voters to vote for candidates of any party. But, unlike the blanket primary
system, the open primary system requires voters to choose only among candidates from
one party. The closed primary system allows voters to vote only for candidates from
their previously chosen party.
3. 93 Wash. 2d 700, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980).
4. Id. at 703, 611 P.2d at 1258.
5. Id. at 705, 611 P.2d at 1259.
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this is done it will become clear that a party right to protected
autonomy during the candidate selection process is not only
founded upon solid constitutional ground but is also in keeping
with sound political wisdom.
I. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Associational Rights in Historical Perspective
The right to free association is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution. Its constitutional status, derived from the
spirit of the first amendment, is a "by-product of many constitu-
tional guarantees, such as the rights of petition and assembly,
the rights of free speech and free press, and the right to vote."
Because it is regarded as a first amendment guarantee, the right
of association enjoys the status of a fundamental right protected
against state impairment by the fourteenth amendment. By the
time the Supreme Court decided NAACP v. Alabama7 in 1958,
the Court thought it "beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an insep-
arable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."' While the right of association
comprehends a variety of private associational activities, it is
first and foremost a political right protecting the freedom of
individuals to join efforts in pursuit of political goals and objec-
tives.9 As a political right, the right of free association consti-
tutes an important and fundamental feature of the democratic
process. Recognizing this fact, the Supreme Court has declared
emphatically that "the National Democratic Party and its
adherents enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political
&ssociation."10 Further, the right is indistinguishable between
the individual and the group or association itself. "Once the
organization is formed, the Constitution protects the self-perpet-
uation of the group as an institution as well as the right of indi-
viduals to seek realization of their aims through the group.""1
6. D. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 38 (1963).
7. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
8. 357 U.S. at 460.
9. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
10. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975).
11. Note, Primary Elections: The Real Party in Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 298,
303 (1974). See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). An association, the Court
declared, "[is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more
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Political scientists are reluctant to classify political parties
as associations in the traditional sense. As one noted party
scholar put it, a party "does not accept the application; it does
not vote the applicant into the association; it may not reject the
application; and, finally there is usually no recognized and
authoritative procedure by which the party may expel a mem-
ber.' 1 2 Nevertheless, political parties consist of individuals who
associate to advance their own political objectives and ideas.
Historically, party activity, including the candidate selection
process, was the purely private affair of party activists. But
efforts to "democratize" the parties, by making the candidate
selection process more open and accessible to all party identifi-
ers, have thrown a shadow of uncertainty over the question of
party privacy. The party caucus, long the private sanctuary of
the party boss, initially gave way to the party convention-still a
private party affair. But the convention system has in turn given
way to the direct primary system as a means of combating the
evils of the party machine."3 At present, all fifty states have
some version of the direct primary for choosing party candidates
for statewide office. 14 The states, called upon to create primary
systems, thus found themselves involved in what previously had
been the purely internal affair of the party, and the courts,
called upon to measure the constitutionality of state primary
legislation, found themselves involved in what has become the
associational rights controversy.
While the Supreme Court has made it clear that the right of
free association protects party autonomy, it has never examined
the extent and limitations of this protection. The most that can
be inferred from Supreme Court decisions is that the right of
free association protects party efforts to pursue its goals in a rea-
sonable and orderly fashion.' 5 The salient question thus becomes
whether the blanket primary system poses a realistic threat to
the ability of political parties to pursue their goals and objec-
tives. To resolve this question, it is necessary to undertake a
more specific inquiry into the nature and scope of party associa-
effective the expression of their own views." Id. at 459.
12. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 56 (1942). See also C. RICE, FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION 105-08 (1962).
13. A. RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION 12-20 (1975).
14. R. SMOLKA, Election Legislation, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 52-75 (1980-81).
15. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957).
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tional rights than the Supreme Court has thus far offered.
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Heavey v.
Chapman1 s provides an excellent vehicle for analysis of the
unique constitutional question raised in the associational rights
controversy. The court, however, apparently failed to appreciate
this unique character. 17 Instead, it quite naturally made an
effort to find a niche for Heavey under existing constitutional
law. Thus, the Washington court considered itself bound by the
precedent of Smith v. Allwright.8 In Smith, the United States
Supreme Court struck down the Texas "white primary" declar-
ing that the Texas Party took on the character of a "state
agency" by virtue of certain duties imposed upon it by state
statute. 9 These "duties do not become matters of private law
because they are performed by a political party."20 Because
political parties were thought to have a public character, the
Court reasoned that the Texas Party could not establish itself as
a private organization with the right to restrict or limit party
membership as a means of excluding some from participation in
important party activities. Because the Washington Democratic
Party's claim to protected party autonomy asked the state to
restrict participation in the Democratic primary to party identi-
fiers only, the Washington court equated it with the claim to the
right to control party membership advanced in Smith.21
The problem in Heavey is substantively different from the
issue the Supreme Court decided in Smith, however, and it is
important to see that the latter does not control the former.
Even the narrowest reading of Smith makes it clear that an
associational rights claim cannot be invoked to close party doors
to any judicially recognized "suspect classes."'2 2 An associational
rights claim cannot be advanced to avoid basic standards of
American democracy. A somewhat broader reading of Smith
suggests that an associational rights claim cannot be advanced
16. 93 Wash. 2d 700, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980).
17. Id. at 704, 611 P.2d at 1259. Responsibility must be shared with the Democratic
Party itself which also apparently failed to perceive the unique constitutional character
of its own claim.
18. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
19. Id. at 663.
20. Id.
21. Heavey, 93 Wash. 2d at 704, 611 P.2d at 1259. See generally Kester, Constitu-
tional Restrictions on Political Parties, 60 VA. L. REv. 735 (1974).
22. See Comment, The Right to Vote and Restrictions on Crossover Primaries, 40
U. Cm. L. REv. 636, 640 (1973).
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to enable the party to rule upon or limit party membership.
According to this reading of Smith, political parties should be
open to all who choose to affiliate with the party, and those who
do should be entitled to participate in all party activities,
including the candidate selection process. Fortunately, it is not
necessary to referee these two readings of Smith since neither is
relevant to the associational rights challenge to the blanket pri-
mary system. This challenge does not claim that parties are enti-
tled to control their membership or to prohibit party identifiers
from participating in party activities. It involves only the claim
that participation in party activities should be restricted to
party identifiers. For example, only those individuals choosing to
affiliate with the Democratic Party should be permitted to par-
ticipate in the candidate selection process. The associational
rights challenge, in effect, claims parties to be autonomous
associations and not private associations. Since the Smith deci-
sion sheds light only on the question of privacy, and not the
question of autonomy, it is not relevant to the associational
rights challenge to blanket primary systems.
Other cases seem to provide precedent more relevant to this
challenge. In Rosario v. Rockefeller,28 for example, the Supreme
Court sustained a New York statute requiring a voter to register
with a political party at least thirty days before the November
general election to be eligible to vote in that party's primary the
following year. The New York legislation was intended to dis-
courage party raiding by requiring a voter to register with the
party of his choice well before that party's upcoming primary.
The statute permitted only those members registered with a
party to participate in that party's primary election; that is, the
statute closed New York primaries in roughly the way the Wash-
ington Democratic Party wanted to see them closed in Washing-
ton. Rosario, who had been living in New York and could have
met the statute's requirements, failed to change party affiliation
in time to qualify for his new party's upcoming primary.2 ' He
challenged the statute, claiming that it abridged his first and
fourteenth amendment rights to vote and associate with the
party of his choice.25 The Court, however, dismissed both
enfranchisement and associational rights issues on the grounds
23. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
24. Id. at 755.
25. Id. at 756.
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that Rosario could have met the statutory requirements if he
had acted more swiftly in changing parties."
The Rosario decision at first appears relevant to the associa-
tional rights challenge for two reasons. First, the decision elabo-
rates on the nature of Rosario's associational rights. Second, the
decision makes clear that statutes closing party primaries to
guard against party raiding can pass constitutional muster. But
first appearances are deceiving. While Rosario begins to expli-
cate the associational rights of individuals - i.e., the right to
join political parties - it does not elaborate on the associational
rights of parties themselves. Further, it is one thing to say that
state legislatures can provide against the evils of party raiding or
crossover voting if they so desire; but it is another to say that
political parties have the right to require the state to make cer-
tain that primary systems do not pose such threats to party
autonomy. Rosario establishes only the former point and conse-
quently is of little use in demonstrating the constitutional neces-
sity of the latter.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court reached a different con-
clusion just a few months after Rosario in Kusper v. Pontikes."
In Kusper, the Court invalidated an Illinois statute prohibiting
citizens from voting in a party primary if they had voted in the
primary of any other party within twenty-three months of their
new party's primary. The Court again emphasized the right of
individuals to associate freely for the advancement of political
beliefs and ideas. The Illinois statute compromised this right,
according to the Court, because it substantially restricted the
right of a voter to change party affiliation. 8
Kusper, like Rosario, is not directly relevant to the associa-
tional rights challenge. Kusper focuses on the associational
rights of individuals rather than parties. But Kusper does sug-
gest that there is a limit to the extent state legislation can lock a
voter into a particular party affiliation by penalizing the voter
with a loss of his primary vote if he changes party affiliation.
While in Rosario the Court found the restraining period tolera-
ble because the plaintiff could have met the standard, in Kusper
the Court considered the twenty-three month restraint unneces-
sarily burdensome.
26. Id. at 759.
27. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
28. Id. at 58.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Cousins v. Wigoda29 is
more promising than either Rosario or Kusper. In Cousins, the
Court was called upon to settle a controversy arising out of the
Democratic National Convention of 1972. Under Illinois law, a
delegation headed by Paul T. Wigoda had the right to be seated
at the convention. However, a group of delegates supporting
William Cousins also arrived at the convention and challenged
the seating of the Wigoda delegation on the grounds that "the
slate-making procedures under which the Wigoda delegates were
selected violated Party guidelines incorporated in the call of the
convention. '3 0 The party's credentials committee supported the
Cousins claim and recommended that the Cousins delegation be
seated in favor of the Wigoda delegation, a recommendation
later adopted by the convention as a whole. Cousins later
pressed his claim before the Supreme Court after Wigoda asked
for and was granted injunctive relief from the convention deci-
sion by the Illinois state courts.83
In reversing the decision of the Illinois court, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the Democratic Party does enjoy a right
of free association for the furtherance of political purposes. The
Court found the candidate selection process of the national
party to be a private affair of that party in which states have no
legitimate interest.32 Thus, at the national level the Court has
declared that parties enjoy a constitutionally protected auton-
omy which permits them to govern their candidate selection pro-
cess according to their own rules. A direct analogy to the states
would suggest that state party autonomy requires that the party
candidate selection process be considered the private affair of
the party. However, no such direct analogy can be drawn. State
adoption of the direct primary system in place of the party con-
vention makes any such analogy impossible. The convention sys-
tem has an aura of privacy about it which apparently made it
easier for the Court to characterize the proceedings of the
national convention as the private affair of the party. State
primaries, however, are elections structured and governed by
state statute, and this, of course, makes them a decidedly public
activity. The claim of constitutionally protected autonomy for
the purpose of selecting candidates for elective office at the state
29. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
30. Id. at 479.
31. Wigoda v. Cousins, 14 Il. App. 3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614 (1973).
32. 419 U.S. at 489-90 (1973).
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level is thus a good deal more complicated than a similar claim
pressed at the national level. Cousins loses its vitality as a prece-
dent for Heavey for just this reason.
The Supreme Court's most recent associational rights deci-
sion, Democratic Party v. State ex.rel. La Follette,33 while still
not conclusive, offers further encouragement for state party
associational rights claims. In La Follette, the national Demo-
cratic Party, in accordance with party rules requiring public dec-
laration of party affiliation by those wishing to participate in the
delegate selection process, indicated they would not seat Wis-
consin delegates selected through the state's open primary sys-
tem.3 4 The state sued the national Democratic Party. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court stated that Wisconsin's primary system
was constitutional and required the party to seat the delegation
elected under the state system." The United States Supreme
Court narrowed the issue to whether a state may compel seating
of delegates chosen in a manner contrary to national party
rules.36 The Court ruled a state may not compel the party to
seat such delegates.37
La Follette not only reaffirms Cousins, it heartily reasserts
the Court's commitment to the view that political parties may
protect themselves from the interference of those unaffiliated
with the party.8 Though the Court cited no evidence to substan-
tiate the claim, it stipulated that the contamination of party
affairs by individuals not affiliated with the party "may seriously
distort its collective decisions-thus impairing the party's essen-
tial functions . . . ." If the Court is correct in this claim (and
we shall argue below that it is) it not only substantially estab-
lishes that the inability to control their candidate selection pro-
cess burdens political parties, but also suggests that the chal-
lenge to party autonomy threatens the health of the democratic
process itself. As in Cousins, the litigating party in La FoUette
was the National Democratic Party rather than a state party.
Therefore, as with Cousins, it is uncertain whether state parties
have similar constitutional protection. Yet the importance the
33. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
34. Id. at 109-13.
35. Id. at 113-14.
36. Id. at 120.
37. Id. at 126.
38. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1951).
39. 450 U.S. at 122.
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Court attached to party privacy in La Follette, along with the
Court's inclination to speak of parties in general and avoid dis-
tinguishing state and national parties,40 suggests the Court
might be willing to extend the logic of La Follette and Cousins
to include state parties.
B. Associational Rights: Standards for Review
The failure to find an appropriate constitutional jacket for
Heavey v. Chapman forces an independent inquiry into the
scope and limits of party associational rights. To undertake the
inquiry, however, it is necessary to establish the standards for
review the Supreme Court has adopted for associational rights
controversies. The Supreme Court consistently has held that the
fourteenth amendment protects constitutional rights against
state intrusion only if the rights in question are "fundamental"
or "essential to a scheme of ordered liberty. '41 But even funda-
mental rights have never been considered absolute.42 The mere
demonstration that state action compromises a fundamental
right is not sufficient to strike down state action on constitu-
tional grounds. 43 The Court has recognized that the right of free
association is fundamental and basically established a two step
analysis to determine whether the state action violates political
parties' associational rights. The Court evaluates the facts of
each associational rights case to determine: (1) whether the
state's action substantially burdens the party's right of free asso-
ciation; and (2) whether the state has a compelling interest in
the legislation.44 By adopting this two part test, the Court has
40. The Court in La Follette, again emphasized the dictum of Cousins that associa-
tional rights protection covers not only the national parties but also their adherents. Id.
at 122; Cousins, 419 U.S. at 487. See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957).
41. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
42. For example, the Court stated in La Follette: "'Neither the right to associate
nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute.'" 450 U.S. at 124.
43. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1956); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 266 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1948); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919); J. CASPER, THE POLITICS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 28-30 (1972).
44. E.g., La Follette, 450 U.S. at 128 (Powell, J., dissenting). At least one commen-
tator maintains that the state must also show that state action is necessary to achieve
the state's interest. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-22, at 786 (1978). In
some associational rights situations the court requires not only that the state action be
necessary to achieve the state's interest but that the state employ the least drastic
restriction upon freedom of association. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
27519821
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refused to set rigid guidelines which might clarify the boundary
between public and private functions of the political parties but
might also "constitutionalize ' '4" state primary systems. The test,
in effect, welcomes further associational rights litigation.
II. ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS AND INTRAPARTY POLITICS
The argument supporting the associational rights challenge
to the blanket primary system is straightforward enough. Party
autonomy is threatened because the blanket primary opens
party candidate selection to all statewide registered voters. With
the primary this open, the party loses the ability to be certain
that it controls the selection of its own candidates for elective
office. And this, it is argued, undermines the ability of party
identifiers to associate for the pursuit of political objectives.
Thus, the blanket primary seems to compromise the recognized
right of political parties to associate for the pursuit of political
objectives.
The strength of this argument must be measured not only
in terms of constitutional law but also in terms of political wis-
dom. The appropriate litmus test here must determine the
nature and degree to which the blanket primary actually threat-
ens party autonomy. This, of course, is an empirical matter and
forces us into the literature of political science. In the remainder
of this section we shall discuss the nature of the threat the blan-
ket primary raises for party autonomy. In the following section
we shall discuss whether this threat is real and damaging to
party autonomy.
Political parties are not debating societies; people do not
join political parties to share thoughts on matters of political
philosophy. Political parties are the vehicles through which peo-
ple seek political power and the purpose of associating with a
party is to gain a measure of that power." A party gains political
power only when successful in getting candidates elected to pub-
lic office. In turn, the success of the party identifiers in gaining
power is tied to the electoral success of the party. From a practi-
cal point of view, the preservation of party autonomy entails
preservation of the political efficacy of those individuals who
(1960).
45. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 388-89 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
46. V.0. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 204-05 (1964); E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 20-25.
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associate with the party. State action compromising party
autonomy also compromises the ability of the individual to pur-
sue political objectives.'
More importantly, political parties give form to American
politics. Because viable candidates for elective office generally
represent one of the two major parties, diverse political interests
are encouraged to join one of these parties to effectively pursue
their political objectives. For this reason, political scientists
characterize political parties as loose coalitions of groups that
associate for the advancement of their political interests.48 This
view of political parties suggests the extent intraparty politics is
important for the group or individual seeking political power.
Political parties are composed of varied and eclectic interests.
These political interests find it necessary to compete with one
another for power or standing within the party structure. From
the standpoint of individual political interests, intraparty strug-
gles are as important as interparty political struggles. Party
reforms leading to the adoption of the direct primary system
were intended simply to make these intraparty struggles more
democratic.49  With the increased "democratization" of
intraparty conflict, intraparty politics becomes an even more sig-
nificant aspect of party operations.
Political scientists have long noted the importance of vital
intraparty politics for the American two party system. 0 This
system militates against the fragmentation of political issues and
thus impedes the rise of factions."' It expands political debate to
reach more members of society by placing specific political
47. See V.0. KEY, JR., supra note 46. Key notes the threat posed to party efficacy by
the open primary system, saying:
[Tihe open primary at times makes difficult the maintenance of orientations
differentiating the two parties and probably handicaps the lesser party in those
jurisdictions in which one party holds a substantial advantage. The voters of
the lesser party may find it more attractive to exercise a balance of power in
the primary of the major party than to engage in the troublesome task of
building up their own party.
Id. at 392. The blanket primary system, as Key correctly notes, is a more drastic version
of the open primary.
48. See E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 12, at 17-63.
49. See A. RANNEY, supra note 13, at 121-34.
50. For a comprehensive discussion of the importance of political parties for the
American democratic process, see W. CHAMBERS, Parties and Nation Building, in POLrTI-
CAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 79-106 (J. LaPalombra & M. Weiner eds.
1966).
51. The classic statement of this argument is to be found in THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(J. Madison). See also G. SARTORI, PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS 22-29 (1976).
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issues within the context of general party discussion." It lends
cohesiveness to political struggle that mitigates the basically
divisive nature of political conflict.53 And it provides political
efficacy for political interests which might. otherwise fail to
receive a fair hearing.
The intraparty struggle, in short, is an important, albeit
informal, aspect of American democracy. Like interparty polit-
ics, intraparty politics is representative in character, with repre-
sentatives of the dominant party interests chosen through the
primary process. Thus, the primary election provides insight
into the policy objectives of the party as a whole. Party candi-
dates for elective office are presumed to represent the wishes of
the majority of the party on a wide range of political issues.
These candidates, in other words, are not just candidates for
elective office in the general election; from the standpoint of
intraparty politics, they represent the party position on issues
that concern party identifiers. This is important not only
because it tells the candidates about the wishes of his party con-
stituents, but also because it gives the party identifiers the
opportunity to gauge their political efficacy within the party."
Like other elections, party primaries are likely to be close
and hotly contested affairs. A small bloc of votes could well
determine the outcome of the election. By opening the primary
to nonparty voters, a small group of nonpartisans is capable of
affecting the outcome of the election and poisoning the demo-
cratic character of intraparty politics. This may involve an
organized intrusion into intraparty politics as in the case of an
interparty "raid" or simply a crossover of nonpartisans. In either
case, the potential results are equally destructive of the demo-
cratic personality of intraparty politics.
The blanket primary system permits just this evil. By open-
ing the ultimate expression of intraparty politics to nonparty
voters, the democratic character of intraparty politics is
threatened just as the democratic character of Washington state
politics would be threatened by permitting Oregonians to vote in
52. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE, 76-94 (1975).
53. N. POLSBY & A. WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 7-17, 125-26 (1968). See
also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 376-89 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
54. This information is crucial to party partisans since without it they are unable to
organize themselves for greater political effectiveness within the party. In the absence of
this information, intraparty coalition building is severely impeded which could easily
result in party partisan alienation from the party, weakening the party system.
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the Washington general election. This is contrary to the spirit of
party reform which brought the primary system into being in
the first place since, rather than making intraparty politics more
democratic, it actually detracts from the democratic character of
the process. Preservation of party autonomy involves nothing
more than the preservation of the democratic character of
intraparty politics.
The blanket primary threatens the integrity of intraparty
politics, and consequently, it jeopardizes party autonomy.
Intraparty politics is the private affair of those groups of indi-
viduals who choose to associate with a party to seek political
clout. Since associating in this fashion enjoys the protection of
the first amendment this protection must also extend to the
internal politics of the parties if this process meets the basic
democratic standards fundamental to American democracy.
State action that pollutes the internal politics of the party must
then violate this first amendment guarantee. This should not be
taken to mean, of course, that the internal functions of the par-
ties are completely beyond the scope of state regulation. As
noted above, the Supreme Court has steadfastly rejected this
point of view. But it does mean, as one commentator put it,
"that the impact on the autonomy of the political party is a fac-
tor that must be considered in deciding the constitutionality of
statutes relating to political parties."55
III. PROOF OF BURDEN
We now examine the extent of the threat posed to party
autonomy by the blanket primary system. Before a political
party can successfully challenge the constitutionality of state
action violating the party's right to free association, the party
must demonstrate an actual burden upon the exercise of the
right. 5" Proving that a statute burdens a party's right to associ-
ate is difficult and complicates challenges to the blanket primary
system. Arguably, proof of actual burden is impossible because
of the secret ballot. This argument is not without appeal because
it is the act of voting itself, as well as the intention of the voter,
that burdens party autonomy.
55. Comment, supra note 22, at 649.
56. See Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex. rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 121-22
(1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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A. Crossover Voting and Raiding
The dilemma created by the demand for proof can be
resolved by distinguishing between "crossover voting" and "raid-
ing." It is difficult to prove the occurrence of party raiding but
the assertion that the difficulty arises from the secrecy of the
ballot is only partially correct. The far greater problem arises
from the need to show intent. The Supreme Court has defined
raiding as the practice "whereby voters in sympathy with one
party designate themselves as voters of another party so as to
influence or determine the results of the other party's pri-
mary. ' 57 Clearly then, raiding occurs only when the intent to
distort a party's primary is present and just as clearly it is
impossible to prove intent from election results. If raiding was
the only act burdening a party's associational rights, then the
assertion that proof of burden is impossible would be correct.
There is, however, an easier solution to the problem of
proof. All voting which cuts across party lines is called "cross-
over voting." 58 The unprovable evil of raiding need not be dis-
cussed here since the eminently provable evil of crossover voting
is, in itself, enough to constitute a clear burden on a party's
associatonal rights. Unlike raiding, the proof of crossover voting
does not depend upon intent; it can be shown statistically and
the burden on a party's associatonal rights can be implied
directly.5 9
B. Crossover Voting as Burden
Crossover voting burdens a party's associational rights by
rendering it impossible for a party to be certain it has chosen its
own candidates in a primary election. Ironically, the primary
election held in Washington immediately after the Heavey deci-
sion provides us with just such a worst case scenario. Two con-
tests in the September 1980 primary merit special attention. In
the Republican Party primary for the United States Senate, a
substantial crossover vote may have dictated the result. In fact,
the size of the crossover vote was 176 percent of the margin of
57. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760 (1973).
58. For a recent discussion of crossover voting and its effects, see Adamany, Com-
munication: Crossover Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules, 70 Am. POL.
Sci. REV. 536 (1976).
59. Id. at 537-39.
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victory between the two leading candidates.6 0 In at least this one
very important race it is likely that Democratic and other cross-
over voters affected the election of the Republican candidate.
The Republican Party was thus not in complete control of its
own candidate selection process. This particular race provided a
classic situation because it was hotly contested while the Demo-
cratic incumbent had only token opposition"' leaving Democrats
free to vote in the Republican race.
Another important though smaller crossover vote occurred
in the Democratic gubernatorial primary. In that race the
incumbent Democrat was defeated as a result of an extremely
large voter turnout coupled with a significant crossover vote.
Both the Democratic winner and the runner-up incumbent
polled a significantly larger number of votes than the winning
Republican.2 Therefore, significant numbers of voters must
have crossed over to vote in the Democratic gubernatorial race,
leaving the Democratic party unable to control its own candi-
date selection process. This single election then, burdened both
60. The usual method for calculating crossover votes is to compare the vote for one
party's combined candidates for a single race with the mean vote cast for that same
party's candidates in all statewide races. See, e.g., D. OGDEN & H. BONE, WASHINGTON
POLITICS 38-40 (1960); Adamany, supra note 58, at 537. Calculated by this method, the
crossover vote in the Republican senatorial race was 224% of the margin of victory
between the two leading candidates! This method considers all votes beyond the mean
vote for a party to be crossovers. It does not consider the phenomenon known as
"undervote" wherein fewer people vote in many of the races than voted in the total
election. By comparing votes in large turnout races (like the race for United States Sen-
ate) with the average vote in all other races, the calculation considers all "extra" voters
to be crossover voters. This consideration ignores the probability that the "extra" voters
are distributed over the political spectrum in much the same way that all other voters
are distributed. In order to account for this "normal" distribution of voters, we have
calculated the crossover vote in a statistically more conservative way that allows for a
percentage of the "extra" votes to be counted as party identifiers and not crossovers. Our
method is to compare the votes cast for one party's combined candidates in a single race
(observed vote or Vo) with the (expected vote Ve) for that party's candidates in the
same race. The difference (Vo - Ve) is the crossover vote. The expected vote is calculated
by dividing a party's total vote in all races (Np) by the total votes cast (N) in all partisan
races, or . The resulting percentage is the percent of the vote that a party can expect
N
to receive in any single race and is not affected by "extra" votes. The expected vote
percentage (still expressed as a ) is then multiplied by the total vote cast for all parties
N
in any single race (Nsr) to obtain the total expected vote for that party in that single
race, or Ve = (!) Nsr.
61. The vote totals in the Democratic race show: the incumbent, 348,471; the other
two candidates, 18,348, and 10,157 respectively. WASH. SECRETARY OF STATE, ABSTRACT OF
VOTES PRIMARY ELECTION (1980).
62. The Republican winner polled only 50.5% as many votes as the winning Demo-
crat and only 69.3% as many votes as the runner-up Democrat incumbent. Id.
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major parties by depriving them of the right to exercise control
over their own candidate selection process in at least two major
statewide races.
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the
existence of crossover voting impairs the effectiveness of both
individual and party associational rights. Because blanket pri-
mary elections are structured for the express purpose of allowing
crossover voting, they impose significant burdens on party asso-
ciational rights. Moreover, the question of the magnitude of the
practice is not relevant to the constitutional question. As the
Supreme Court characterized the practice of patronage: "It is
the practice itself, not the magnitude of its occurrence, the con-
stitutionality of which must be determined."" So, too, it is the
practice of crossover voting, or even its availability, that threat-
ens the democratic nature of intraparty politics and conse-
quently burdens a party's associational rights.
IV. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST v. AssoCIATIONAL RIGHTS
Even if it can be shown that a party's associational rights
are abridged by the blanket primary, that abridgement can be
legitimized by a state demonstration of a compelling interest in
favor of the blanket primary." When considering compelling
state interest arguments, the Supreme Court has asked whether
the state's interests are correctly identified and whether the leg-
islation is accurately designed to achieve those interests."
Most arguments asserted in favor of a state's compelling
interest in blanket primaries may be grouped under the single
category: "preservation of the democratic process." ' 6 Certainly
the preservation of the democratic process is an extremely com-
pelling interest for all, including the state. We must examine,
however, whether the blanket primary system actually preserves
the democratic process.
Most of these arguments suggest that increasing voter
63. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 354 (1976).
64. See Heavey v. Chapman, 93 Wash. 2d 700, 702, 611 P.2d 1256, 1257 (1980).
65. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
66. Comment, The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting in Political Party Pri-
mary Elections, 14 WILLAMETrI L.J. 259 (1978). See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
368 (1976), for the United States Supreme Court's recognition of the "preservation of the
democratic process" as a compelling state interest.
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choice increases voter participation. 7 They assert that primary
elections that force a voter to choose from one or the other
party's slate unnecessarily restrict a voter's choice and therefore
discourage participation. 8 Furthermore, it is argued, this pro-
cess precludes participation of the independent voter in the pri-
mary election process.69
The initial half of this argument, that expanded voter par-
ticipation results from expanded voter choice, rests on two
assumptions not supported by the relevant facts. The first
assumption is that many independent voters are eager to vote if
not constrained by the necessity to choose a party or state a
party preference. The second assumption is that the average
voter, even a party identifier, would more likely vote if he could
vote for the individual and not the party.
Though there have been recent reassessments concerning
the independent voter, evidence still suggests that "indepen-
dents" are less likely to vote than party identifiers. 0 In fact,
strength of party identity appears to correlate directly with par-
ticipation. According to Flanigan and Zingale: "Strong partisans
are more likely to vote in all kinds of elections than either weak
partisans or independents. 7 1 A comparison of two geographi-
cally contiguous states, Washington and Oregon, both with long
standing populist traditions, goes far in substantiating this
claim. Washington's blanket primary elections have consistently
shown much lower turnouts than Oregon's closed primary elec-
tions.7 2 This is true in spite of the fact that turnout in the gen-
eral elections in both states is nearly the same. 3 It would appear
67. Heavey v. Chapman, 93 Wash. 2d 700, 703, 611 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1980); Com-
ment, supra note 66, at 275-81.
68. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 66, at 276-78.
69. Id. at 278.
70. See, e.g., J. CLOTFELTER & C. PRYSBY, POLITICAL CHOICES 40-41 (1980); W.
Cso'rrY & G. JACOBSON, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 36-37 (1980); W. FLANIGAN & N.
ZINGALE, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 58-64 (3d ed. 1975); A. RAN-
NEY, supra note 13, at 52.
71. W. FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, supra note 70, at 57 (emphasis added).
72. In the two decades since 1960, Oregon has averaged 65.5% voter turnout. ORE.
SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF VOTES PRIMARY ELECTION at X (1980). Wash-
ington for the period averaged only 48.95%. WASH. SECRETARY OF STATE, ABSTRACT OF
VOTES PRIMARY ELECTION 1 (1960); Id. (1964); Id. (1968); Id. (1972); WASH. SECRETARY OF
STATE, ABSTRACT OF VOTES PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTIONS 1 (1976); Id. (1980).
73. For general elections held in 1964, 1968, 1972, and 1976, Oregon had 80.75%
voter turnout. ORE. SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF VOTES PRIMARY ELECTION
at X (1980). For the same period, Washington had a voter turnout of 78.49%. WASH.
SECRETARY OF STATE, ABSTRACT OF VOTES PRIMARY ELECTION (1964); Id. (1968) (inside
1982]
284 University of Puget Sound Law Review
then, that the argument asserting that the blanket primary
allows and encourages the broadest possible participation in the
primary election, 4 is simply false.
What factors account for low voter turnout in the Washing-
ton blanket primary? We believe that low voter turnout is
caused in large part by the continued decline of party efficacy in
Washington as a direct result of the blanket primary, where par-
ties are not free to associate effectively to choose their own can-
didates for office. Without party efficacy there can be no strong
party identity and it is clear that less party identity means less
participation. As Austin Ranney, a noted party scholar, suggests,
"the more partisan they are, the more likely they are to vote."75
According to Ranney, one of the major reasons people vote less
in primary elections than in general elections is the absence of
interparty competition.7 6 By the same reasoning, a major reason
for low voter turnout in blanket primaries, as compared with
other primary forms, is the absence of genuine intraparty
competition.
If every voter has the opportunity to vote in the primary
elections of both Republican and Democratic parties, then the
concept of party membership is meaningless. 77 If the concept of
party membership, however loosely defined becomes meaning-
less, so too, must the meaningfulness of parties themselves be
cast in serious doubt. This would seem to militate against efforts
to preserve the democratic process.
The viability of parties is crucial to the proper functioning
of our political processes. Our democratic system depends on the
electoral process as its cornerstone. Political parties are the best
vehicles in any democratic society for the aggregation of inter-
ests, promotion of voter turnout, clarification of political issues,
and enhancement of candidate identification.7 8 Even so, the
blanket primary might be acceptable if "voter freedom" was
able to substitute parallel functions or take over existing party
functions, without which our democratic system would be in
front cover); Id. (1972) (inside front cover); WASH. SECRETARY OF STATE, ABSTRACT OF
VOTES PiuMARY AND GENERAL ELECTION 11 (1976).
74. Heavey v. Chapman, 93 Wash. 2d 700, 705, 611 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1980).
75. A. RANNEY, supra note 13, at 52.
76. Id. at 128.
77. Id. at 164.




jeopardy. Given the nature of the so-called independent voter in
America, we cannot expect to find such functions carried out by
anyone but parties. It is ironic that no democratic country in the
world gives as much importance to the independent voter and
yet almost no democratic country surpasses us in low voter
turnout.79
The blanket primary system then, discourages rather than
encourages voter participation; it is detrimental to party efficacy
but creates no substitute for party functions. It should thus be
judged to destroy rather than preserve the democratic process.
The compelling state interest in preserving the democratic pro-
cess is best served by allowing for efficacious party association.
Another argument suggests the state has a compelling inter-
est in blanket primaries because closed primaries exclude inde-
pendent voters. Technically, of course, this is true. If one regis-
ters as an independent, in closed primary states one may not
vote in a party's primary. But this technical exclusion need not
be thought of as a disenfranchisement of a class of voters.
The Supreme Court has distinguished between the abridge-
ment of the right to vote, disenfranchisement, and a mere impo-
sition of certain contingency requirements on the right to vote. 0
In Rosario, the Court described the New York laws concerning
enrollment deadlines as merely conditioning the right to vote
rather than disenfranchising any particular class.8 The Court
went on to say: "[I]f their plight can be characterized as disen-
franchisement at all, it was not caused by [the law], but by their
own failure to take timely steps to effect their enrollment." ' 2
The question concerning the independent voter in closed pri-
mary states is whether technical exclusion of a certain class of
voters equates with disenfranchisement. The condition or status
of being independent is assumed by the voter by his own free
choice. It does not, therefore, unconstitutionally discriminate
against or disenfranchise any person. If the law relating to party
primary elections prescribes beforehand the exclusion of anyone
choosing to register as an independent, then each voter who so
chooses does so with full knowledge that the choice includes not
voting in the primary election. Independents are excluded from
79. "It is claimed that American voting turnout exceeds that of only one other
democracy-Botswana." W. CRoTrY & G. JAcoBSoN, supra note 70, at 5.
80. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
81. Id. at 758, 762.
82. Id. at 758.
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voting just as anyone will be if he should choose not to register
at all. Since party primary elections are for the sole purpose of
selecting party nominees this does not seem a burdensome con-
dition on the individual. Yet it certainly preserves party rights,
efficacy, and autonomy.
Arguments stressing the rights of the individual to have an
effective vote in the primary election simply fail to accurately
account for the nature of the American political process.8s In our
system, the voter is effective only when he associates with others
for the purpose of pooling votes, a fact which led to the forma-
tion of political parties in the United States. Additionally, in our
system where parties are the cornerstone of the electoral pro-
cess, the individual's effectiveness is contingent on the effective-
ness of his party." The blanket primary, allowing crossover vot-
ing, erodes party effectiveness. This, in turn, weakens the
effectiveness of the individual voter. Stressing the individual
voter's free choice among all candidates is viable only in an elec-
toral process where individuals do not pool votes to win elec-
tions. Since this is not the case in the United States, these argu-
ments favoring the blanket primary lack relevance to political
reality.
A final argument favoring the blanket primary system is
that it allows each voter to keep his party identification, if any,
secret.85 Proponents of this argument state that maintaining the
secrecy of party identification is merely an extension of the
secret ballot, and is necessary to prevent employers or others
from pressuring the individual."
Though we believe that pressures concerning party identifi-
cation may be more imagined than real in the present day, there
is, nonetheless, the possibility of negative consequences. Even
conceding that the state has an interest in protecting the secrecy
of party identification, there are ways of accomplishing this that
do not permit crossover voting. Public disclosure of party identi-
fication does not necessarily follow from closed primary systems.
Certainly, whatever difficulties a state may experience in trying
to incorporate party identification secrecy into closed primary
election laws pales in comparison to the considerable burden the
83. See, Brief of Amicus Curiae at 6, (Aronson) Heavey v. Chapman, 93 Wash. 2d
700, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980); Comment, supra note 66, at 276-77.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
85. Heavey v. Chapman, 93 Wash. 2d 700, 705, 611 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1980).
86. Comment, supra note 66, at 279.
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blanket primary system places on parties' associational rights.
Since there are other means available for its attainment, the
secrecy argument alone cannot support the argument that the
state has a compelling interest in the blanket primary.
The compelling state interest arguments advanced in favor
of the blanket primary system have been shown to rely on a mis-
understanding of the actual workings of our democratic process.
The blanket primary both discourages voter participation and
burdens the associational rights of individuals and parties. As
such it is destructive of, rather than preservative of, the demo-
cratic process.
V. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the issue raised by Heavey v. Chapman
is whether preservation of the integrity of intraparty politics
promotes or hinders the democratic process. While the law dic-
tates the form such controversies must take in a legal forum,
political wisdom must be the controlling factor in their final dis-
position. Political parties are vital elements of the democratic
process, but political scientists have noted their slow decay.
State action contributing to this decay is certainly contrary to
the best interests of the parties and consequently to the best
interest of the democratic process. The right to associate for
political purposes provides the parties with a strong constitu-
tional instrument to fight well-meaning but misguided state
action that furthers party decay. But the parties can be success-
ful with their associational rights claims only if courts are aware
of the importance of party autonomy for American democracy.
We have argued that the blanket primary system is destructive
of party autonomy; the blanket primary not only leads to the
breakdown of intraparty politics, it also indirectly inhibits par-
ticipation in the electoral process. Thus it would be in keeping
with the integrity of the democratic process for the courts to
uphold party constitutional challenges to state blanket primary
systems.
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